College Democrats at the University of Delaware

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CHAPTER 2: CONSERVATIVES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY: A HISTORY OF DISSENT
In 1992, President William Jefferson Clinton was elected to the presidency promising a “third way” in American politics. Combining the ideals of the emergent neoliberal political philosophy, Clinton advocated for a truce between unfettered free market hegemony and democratic socialism. Under the third way, Clinton would eliminate an old welfare system for a new, comprehensive ‘welfare to work’ program, approved pro-business farm policies and eliminated barriers to international trade by opening the U.S. to investment and cutting many tariffs. Clinton’s pursuit of third way politics was complimented internationally with the election of Tony Blair as prime minister of Great Britain, and leader of the nation’s leftist Labour Party.
Third way politics influenced party politics in the United States as well. The Democratic Party’s experiments with the New Left in the 1960’s and 1970’s started tearing at the fabric of the Democratic identity. In the 1980’s, the Southern Bull-Weevil coalition, alienated by the influx of big-government ideas, aided President Ronald Reagan’s Republican Congressional minority’s advance of pro-business economic policies through the Congress. In the early 1990’s, the Bull-Weevils morphed into the Blue Dog Democrats, a coalition of pro-business, “fiscally-responsible” Congressmen who believe in eliminating the deficit and reigning in government spending.
The creation of the Blue Dog coalition however, is much more storied than an international desire for third way politics starting in the early 1990’s. Pro-business, anti-government, states’ rights factions have emanated within the Democratic Party infrastructure since the 18th Century. The movement to reclaim the party identity from the New Deal/Great Society big-government Democrats has marked the ideological turf war that pits a small, but influential coalition against the prevailing identity of the new Democratic Party. This cross-factional battle is not new. The Democratic Party has long been an amalgamation of varied interests and identities pressing for social change and justice.
With the absence of a tumultuous event, such as the Civil War that initiated Reconstruction in the South, or the New Left’s anti-government upheaval in the Vietnam War era, the future of the Democratic Party is uncertain. The only certainty is that losing sight of the fundamental history of anti-government movements within the “pro-government” party strengthens the partisan view of American politics into two antipodal paradigms. The vision of a “red” America as polar opposite to a “blue” America ignores the sociopolitical reality of factionalism, or varied interests, among the people and in the Congress that represents them. Here I discuss the development of the Democratic Party from the early 20th Century, and describe how demographic developments have fundamentally reshaped and realigned the party along a new progressive philosophy. The reaction to the Democratic identity reverberates into today’s politics in the form of the Congressional Blue Dog Democrats.
The “Solid South” and “New Dealocrats”, 1928 - 1960
The reforms brought under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 signaled the first signs of Democratic Party fracturing. FDR won in a landslide victory over incumbent Republican President Herbert Hoover, whose underwhelming reaction to the Great Depression condemned his reelection prospects in the minds of many voters. In the first one hundred days of Roosevelt’s presidency, Congress acted at a frantic pace to boost the national economy, lift workers out of unemployment and repair the inflation that left the U.S. economy in pieces.
When FDR was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, he immediately pressed Congress to pass legislation designed to stimulate the economy. The first priority on his desk was a comprehensive banking bill designed to prevent banks from foreclosing. The Emergency Banking Act passed on March 9th, five days after FDR took office. FDR’s Democratic Congress then moved to expedite the repeal of prohibition with the Volstead Act by permitting wine and beer imports, passed price supports for farmers, added an unrequested direct block grant of $500,000,000 for the states and attached $3.3 billion in public works appropriations to the National Industrial Recovery Act. Several other first one hundred days initiatives were also designed to protect homes and workers. The Home Owner’s Loan Act extended short-term loans to long-term mortgages, saving many homeowners from foreclosure and bankruptcy. The National Industrial Recovery Act (Wagner Act) established the famous “Section 7(A)” guaranteeing labor unions the right to collective bargaining (Allswang, 1978). After collective bargaining was legalized, union membership more than doubled from 12.3% of the workforce in 1930 to 27.6% a decade later (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001).
Arguably the most visible reality of the Great Depression was unemployment. In 1933, 24.9% of the U.S. workforce was unemployed, compared to 3.3% between the 1923 and 1929 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). In 1934, Congress acted to expand employment programs by establishing the Civil Works Administration (CWA) to provide jobs to skilled construction laborers. The CWA complimented an earlier federal employment program, the Civil Conservation Corps (CCC) that employed unskilled male laborers between 18 and 24. Together the CWA and CCC would construct schoolhouses, bridges, highways and roads, among other public works projects that aimed at employment opportunity and investment in the American infrastructure. The success of both programs led to Roosevelt’s Executive Order 7036 creating the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1939. The WPA however, was broader in scope than the earlier unemployment programs: not only did the federal government seek to hire construction workers, but it also helped builders, teachers and artists. Employment opportunities were extended to almost everyone, even two million high school and college students who took advantage of the new National Youth Administration.
Once immediate relief for families was achieved, the Roosevelt administration acted to establish a social insurance system that would help workers retire once they reach old age. In 1935, Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which provided pensions for workers in the federally regulated railroad industry (Allswang, 1978, p. 18). Correspondingly, Congress enacted the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Act (OASDI), also known as Social Security to establish a system of supplemental security income to old age retirees.
Although Roosevelt expanded the Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives from 217 in 1930 to 322 in 1932, he also alienated parts of the Democratic majority with the rapid federal expansion of power. Borrowing an axiom from physics, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction: as the federal bureaucracy and the Democratic majority increased, so too did the divergence within the Democratic Party with particular factions. Thus, while the 73rd United States Congress (1934-1936) drastically increased federal power, they were confronted with two emergent political realities: the break with Southern Democrats and the dissatisfaction of Northern business interests. The latter would refocus the Democratic identity around the working-class laborers, and the former would fight, albeit unsuccessfully, for less federal power.
The most obvious piece of domestic legislation that was missing from the New Deal package was a comprehensive civil rights law. The fear of antagonizing the Southern Democrats pressured Roosevelt to stand away from civil rights legislation. The Roosevelt Administration favored a bill making lynching a federal crime, but even that civil rights proposal was not realized. In a discussion with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s Walter White, Roosevelt said bluntly: “If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, [the southerners] will block every bill I ask Congress to pass [that] keeps America from collapsing.” (Allswang, 1978). Of the 103 Congressmen representing the states of the former Confederacy, only two were Republicans in 1934, and both represented the same area of Tennessee that voted against secession from the Union.
The Solid South was very much in tact through the New Deal, mostly because Southerners remained hostile toward the Republican Party for the legacy of Congressional Reconstruction. After presidential reconstruction ended in 1867, the Republican Congressional majority imposed strict requirements that enfranchised hundreds of thousands of Blacks. Senate estimates in 1890 suggest that 672,000 Blacks would be enfranchised in Southern states with the adoption of the 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although the White electorate of those states totaled 925,000, post-Reconstruction federal laws barred over 300,000 former Confederates from voting. In a series of Reconstruction Acts starting in February of 1867, the Republican Congressional majority divided the South (except Tennessee) into five military districts, and stationed federal troops at polling places to ensure enfranchisement of newly freed Blacks. In order for Southern states to be readmitted into the Union, they were forced to ratify the 14th and 15th Amendments in state constitutional conventions.
New Deal-era Southern Democrats still carried the sentiment of the Reconstruction South. Enfranchisement of Blacks meant that mostly Blacks would ratify the constitutional amendments in state conventions that gave them the “privileges and immunities of citizenship” and the right to vote regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” “Carpetbaggers” from the north moved south just to organize Blacks to vote, and among white Southerners “scalawags” helped Blacks to make profit. The combination of strict requirements that demanded immediate enfranchisement of Blacks after the Civil War, the federal dissolution of state governments, and the movement to organize Blacks politically in the South buffered the Republican Congressional majority with Black Southern Republicans. Black Congressmen who were formerly slaves increased state debts by $31.7 million. Federal troops were withdrawn from the South in 1872. By 1884 the Black vote was reduced by one half in South Carolina, one third in Louisiana, and one quarter in Mississippi. By 1900, across the South states enacted laws that effectually re-disenfranchised Blacks, threw their representatives out of Congress, and eliminated the Black vote. White Southern animus toward the Republican Party soon took precedence over the agrarian/corporate class conflicts that formerly divided the South, and unified the South against Republicans for generations (Patch 1932).
Southerners were left united behind the Democratic Party, but many simply had reservations with the New Deal. Across the nation, the overwhelming desire for federal government intervention in a massive economic depression gave FDR the political capital he needed to oversee an expansion of the role of government. The success of the New Deal among the electorate even led many Americans to forget the Democratic Party label and refer to Roosevelt’s party as “The New Dealers” (Oliver 1937). Despite the New Deal’s prosperity, a more malleable idea would open a fissure within the Democratic caucus that transcended the legacy of slavery alone: states’ rights.
In 1936, the issue of states’ rights arose with only minor protest, organized largely around the Republican nominee of the election year. Roosevelt’s second run for the presidency resulted in a landslide victory where he garnered 523 electoral votes and carried every state except Vermont and Maine. He crushed the Republican Party’s nominee, Alf Landon of Kansas, with over 60% of the national popular vote. Landon blasted what he termed to be the “New Dealocrats’” economic agenda, once noting in a campaign speech: “True Democrats have been sold down the river” (Oliver 1937). Landon expressed reservations with the New Deal’s collective bargaining arrangement, but generally supported the overall program. In Texas, a group of “Constitutional Democrats” organized to support Landon, while a larger group of national “Jeffersonian Democrats” worked to defeat Roosevelt nationally (Patch 1951).
The first express document relating to states’ rights within the Democratic majority came in what the newspapers of the late 1930’s would term “the Conservative Manifesto.” Authored by Senator Josiah W. Bailey (D-North Carolina), the manifesto was a rallying call and a warning for Democrats to reclaim their party from Roosevelt. Bailey believed that Roosevelt was using his popularity to break with the Southern Democrats and form a third party with the unions. In early May 1937, Bailey remarked: “[Roosevelt] wants a party of his own, molded to his own conceptions and of course he intends to run for a third term” (Moore 1965). The Manifesto called for: opposition to “unnecessary” government competition with private enterprise; recognition that private investment and enterprise require reasonable profit; maintenance of states rights, home rule, and local self-government, except where proved definitely inadequate; and economic and non-political relief to unemployed with maximum local responsibility, among other things (Moore 1965). In order to prevent prominence of the “anti-New Deal”, Roosevelt quickly worked with New York Senator Robert Wagner of New York and George Norris of Nebraska to resist conservative opposition (Kickler 2010). Nevertheless, historian John Robert Moore (1965) argued that the manifesto itself was a mechanism to articulate conservative values and return two-party politics to the South (Moore, 1965).
Subtle legislative signs of party factionalism emerged in the debate and roll call over the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. FLSA guaranteed workers a national minimum wage, time-and-a-half, overtime compensation for particular occupations and prohibited minors from “oppressive child labor” (29 U.S.C. § 212). In the FLSA vote, 38 of the 41 Democratic Congressmen who voted against the measure represented districts in the former Confederacy. In Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and North Carolina, the Democratic state delegations were nearly unanimous in opposition. Some opposition also arose from large segments of the Texas and Tennessee delegations. Employing an economic model that controlled for population size, Fleck (2002) found that opposition to the FLSA came from districts where few low wage workers voted (Fleck, 2002). Fleck asserts that opposition to FLSA could be interpreted as a sign of further disenfranchisement of Blacks, and as a clearer reflection of values. Historians Brady and Bullock (1981) asserted that the 1938 FLSA vote was the first vote of the fracture: “The emergence of a conservative coalition in 1938 effectively ended the President’s ability to push further domestic policy changes through the Congress. The coalition became active on a bill that, like civil rights legislation, split the Northern and Southern wings of the party” (Brady, 1981).
The FLSA vote also revealed a growing urban base in the Democratic Party. By 1938, migratory and immigration patterns formed a new coalition of urban and ethnic voters. New urban ethnics and working class whites realigned with the Democratic Party because the party became the impetus for social change amidst economic tumult. Among the New Deal policies important to the working class: the Wagner Act allowing collective bargaining, the National Industrial Recovery Act and the many social insurance programs that protected individuals in poverty (Allswang, 1978). Movement in the Democratic ethnic vote in Chicago between 1930 and 1942 for instance, reveals the strength of the urban realignment. Jewish Democratic support increased from 15% in 1930 to 77% in 1942. Similarly, Polish Democratic support increased from 39% to 80%; German support from 18% to 69%; and, Italian support from 31% to 64% (Allswang 1978).
The urban Northeast, once a bastion of Republican support, started seeing movement in the proportion of manufacturing workers voting Democratic. In the 1930 midterm election under President Hoover, 48% of highly industrialized manufacturing communities voted Democratic. In 1936, that number rose to 56% (Allswang, 1978). Ware (2002) however, notes that Republican turnout was not depressed between 1920 and 1964. There is a correlation, albeit a small one, between the proportion of Republican votes and the proportion of Republican identifiers in the electorate of .069 (Ware, 2002). Ware poses a different argument, suggesting that the margin does not necessarily matter as much as the actual turnout. Through the 1940’s, the percentage of Democratic identifiers declined, suggesting that Republicans were still the party composed of educated, upper class voters who consequently, were more likely to vote. Roosevelt, through his populist message and his magnanimous persona appealed to the margins of the electorate. The New Deal Democratic margin was one created by the mobilization, and not necessarily strong identification with the Democratic Party.
Even if Democratic turnout declined in the 1940’s, the Democratic Congressional majority was solid for all but two Congresses between 1940 and 1960. In the intervening years, Republicans captured a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 80th and 83rd United States Congresses, respectively (1947-49; 1953-55). Republicans won their highest share of Congressional seats in the 1946-midterm elections with 245. 1945 was also the year Democrats attained their lowest level of Congressional representation with 184 seats. Figure 1.1 shows a longitudinal view of party representation in the highly industrialized Northeast from the 1946 midterm election to 1958. 1946 was chosen because it was the highest point of Republican representation, and lowest point of Democratic representation; 1952 was chosen because Republicans recaptured the House and it was the second peak in Republican victory in this period; and, 1958 was chosen because it represented the largest Democratic majority with the lowest level of Republican representation. It is also noteworthy that 1946, 1952 and 1958 follow in six-year cycles.
The South was solidly behind the Democratic Party through the 1950’s, but the Northeast started on a trend toward the Democratic Party with Al Smith’s nomination against Herbert Hoover in 1928. Figure 1.1 shows Democratic gains in 1952 and 1958. In the 1946 midterms, Democrats controlled only one Northeastern state delegation (Rhode Island). By 1952, Democrats advanced in every Northeastern state except Maine and Vermont, even though Republicans recaptured their majority. In 1958, the Democratic Party’s inroads in the industrialized Northeast delivered. Combined with the Party’s Solid South, Northeastern Democrats equaled the total number of Republicans in that region.
Most illustrative of the Northeastern Democratic gain was Pennsylvania. In 1946, Democrats held only 5 seats amidst the largest Republican incursion into the House of Representatives since the beginning of the New Deal. While Pennsylvania previously had upwards of 11 Democratic representatives, this period marks when the party gained support among working class voters and urban immigrants alike. Republicans barely held onto the majority of the state delegation in 1958 where they previously maintained an overwhelming majority. The size of Pennsylvania, and the prominence of Philadelphia, gave it 15 more Congressional districts than it has in 2010. Ware (2002) asserts that the Democratic coalition was much more fluid than the Republicans in this era. Where Republican turnout held consistent, Democrats were less likely to turn out. General elections tended toward Democratic candidates, and the presence of a Democratic presidential nominee aided Congressional candidates. From 1940 to 1952, Democratic support was on average 6.7 percent higher in presidential election years. Depressed turnout in midterm elections helped Republicans recapture some Congressional seats in the urban Northeast because Democrats were less likely to turn out (Ware, 2002). New Democratic strength in the Northeast gave Democrats stronger majorities because of their lock on the Solid South. A stronger Northern party and advances in the West helped the Democrats build a coalition that reduced the campaign field for Republicans significantly.
The more profound implication involves the bifurcation of the party into Northern working class and immigrant voters and Southerners. Appealing to Northern Democrats and Republicans, President Truman called for Congress to enact an anti-poll tax, anti-lynching and fair employment practice measures recommended in a report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. Southern Democrats were furious. Seeing attempts to block the nomination of Truman at the Democratic Convention in 1948 as fruitless, Southern Democrats established a States’ Rights Democratic Party, famously called the “Dixicrats.” The Dixicrats nominated Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi as their presidential and vice presidential candidates. Their goal was not necessarily to appeal nationally with a states’ rights platform, but at least to force a close vote where none of the three parties would win a plurality in the Electoral College, throwing the election into the House of Representatives. In doing so, the Dixicrats hoped to attain concessions from the Democratic majority on civil rights issues (Patch 1951).
Truman was reelected without controversy, and the Southern vote only deprived him of 39 electoral votes. The Dixicrats’ attempt to block a Northern anti-Jim Crowe agenda nevertheless represented an explicit split with the majority. On economic issues as well, some Southern Democrats expressed antipathy for Truman’s Fair Deal agenda. Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-Virginia) would frequently criticize the Truman Administration for “trying to socialize your health, socialize your food, and socialize the roof over your head.” Byrd claimed the administration was planning a “massive invasion of states’ rights” and gradually “centralizing power in a gigantic, sprawling bureaucracy which [was] way to big to audit.”

Byrd’s discussion of “socialism” reveals another fracture in the New Deal and Fair Deal coalition: the philosophical break with classical liberalism. Central to liberal thought is Montesquieu and Locke’s assertion of individual empowerment. John Stewart Mill and Adam Smith would later expand upon the concept of the individual to discuss the pursuit of liberty, and liberty in the free markets. Inevitably, the ideas of the classical liberals would be embraced by American revolutionaries who authored a liberal Constitution that protected certain fundamental freedoms from government. Early in the new Republic, Alexander Hamilton founded the Federalist Party, a cohort of bankers and industrialists who wanted a strong federal government and weaker state governments. Opposite Hamilton was Thomas Jefferson’s Anti-Federalist party, which held that states were most directly capable to represent the farmer and average working class American.
The small government ideas of Jeffersonian democracy would pervade through the 18th and 19th Centuries, and the Democratic Party would inherit Jefferson’s vision. In the 20th Century, economic events demanded a greater role for the federal government. The New Deal coalition turned away from classical liberalism and favored a strong, central government. The philosophical departure from state to federal did not change their reliance of the individual in society, but it did change who best protected the individual. No longer were states the protectors of liberty. Instead, the protector of fundamental rights was the federal government. Illustrating resistance to this early 20th Century change, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that “states are laboratories for experimentation” and later found the National Industrial Recovery Act invalid on Commerce Clause grounds [Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 295 U.S. 495 (1935)]. Justice Brandeis would remark to a Roosevelt aide: “This is the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the president that we're not going to let this government centralize everything.” A more harsh criticism of the party’s movement from states’ rights to federal intervention came from philosopher and journalist John T. Flynn (1950) who argued that the New Deal reforms came dangerously close to Mussolini-style fascism. Flynn, formerly a Democrat, became an influential writer and was influential in the modern Libertarian movement (Flynn, 1950).
The New Deal represented an ideological change from the Democratic orientation of the past. The New Dealers reliance on government as an instrument for social justice opened the party to new Northeastern urbanites and immigrants who were suffering during the Great Depression. Old factions within the Democratic Party collided with new factions, and created a North and South divide that would begin the process of realignment along ideological lines. In 1950, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-South Dakota) suggested the expedition of the divide. Mundt’s plan called for a Republican alliance with Southern Democrats where one party asserted the powers of the federal government, and the other asserted the role of federalism. Mundt’s plan was dismissed, but his concept would later become a political reality, as events would erode the Democrats’ solid south.
The 30-year period between 1930 and 1960 represented an era of terrific realignment and increasing factionalism within the Democratic Party. In 1952, the election of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower over Democratic Illinois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson did not signal a major realignment, but Eisenhower did win several states in the solid south. A popular military general after the Second World War, Eisenhower carried Texas, Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. Despite Eisenhower’s popularity only 28 new Republicans were elected to Congress in 1952. Democrats retained control of the House for all but one Congress between 1940 and 1950, and despite the hopes of many Republicans, Eisenhower did not repeal any of the New Deal programs. Roosevelt drastically expanded the scope of federal power and lifted America out of a depression in doing so. The changes implemented under FDR altered the coalitions and the philosophies of the party that formerly asserted strong central governments. Reverberations from the New Deal coalition impacted the Republican Party as well; coming out of the Progressive Era, moderate Republicans who asserted the power of the federal government for positive change gradually became Democrats. Over the next 30 years, the changes recommended by the Mundt plan would become realized, and the most profound realignment in American history would begin.
Redefinition, 1960-1980
Within the purview of resistance within the Democratic caucus, three areas of particular analysis are relevant: the nature and orientation of opposition in the Democratic caucus, the influence of the presidency on the caucus, and the inter-party influences that affected Congressional dynamics. The focus here is on the Democrats in the Congress, and not necessarily the events that led to the creation of new policy initiatives and the Congressional response as I highlighted earlier with the New Deal programs. The period of 1960 to 1980 reflects the further realignment of the Democratic Party along Northern and Southern lines, but the official “break” with party would not occur in the South until the 1994 “Republican Revolution.” This period is notable for the (mostly) Southern Democrats that influenced President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Great Societies program and later, President Jimmy Carter’s economic policy.
The Southern Democratic caucus continued to be most resistant to the Democratic majority’s initiatives. On domestic policy, Southern House Democrats opposed the president (on all roll call votes where President Johnson declared a position) 26% of the time during the 90th Congress. For comparison, Southern Republicans opposed the President 64% of the time, and across the board, Southern Congressmen expressed higher opposition and lower support for Democratic legislation. Southern Democrats supported President Johnson’s agenda 61% of the time, compared with significantly higher levels for Eastern (85%), Western (82%) and Midwestern (81%) support (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964).
Table 2.1 compares selected Northern and Southern median Congressional members’ support and opposition to President Johnson’s domestic policy agenda. Although Northern states were slightly more likely to support the President’s agenda, Southern states were more varied, perhaps as a result of their rural composition. For example, Congressmen from the entire state of New York supported the agenda 59% of the time. When I isolated Congressmen specifically from the New York City metropolitan region, median support jumps to 83%. Congressmen were more likely to oppose than support the president’s agenda if they represented a community outside New York City (18 metropolitan Congressmen; 22 outside the New York metro region).
‘Ruralness’ alone cannot describe the relationship between the state and city contrast. It is clear that the variance in Southern support and opposition to the sweeping domestic policy agenda in President Johnson’s first year was met with different levels of success within state delegations. Mississippi Congressmen for instance, opposed Johnson’s policies 55% of the time, higher than Eastern Republicans (40%), Western Republicans (52%), and slightly below Midwestern Republicans (59%). In contrast, North Carolinian Congressmen supported the agenda 63% of the time, and opposed 32%. This trend is consistent, with most Southern state Democrats exhibiting a higher level of support than may be expected.
Two areas of analysis can further describe Southern opposition: specific legislators, and specific legislation. Congressional Quarterly’s analysis of 1963 roll call votes for example, reveals that the top five most frequent Democratic defectors represented Southern constituencies, two of whom represented Mississippi. Rep. Thomas Abernethy (D-MS) voted against the majority 69% of the time. The Republican nominee of 1964, Barry Goldwater, carried Abernethy’s Congressional district with 83% of the vote. Similarly, Rep. John Bell Williams (D-MS) voted against the majority on 60% of votes and Goldwater carried his district with 89%. There appears to be a relationship between a high victory margin of a Republican Party presidential candidate and the Democratic Congressman’s party voting record. In 1962, Abernethy defeated a Republican opponent with 92% of the vote, and in 1964 was reelected without a general election challenge (Congressional Quarterly, 1960; Congressional Quarterly, 1962). Judis and Teixeira (2002) assert that Goldwater was a strong candidate against Johnson in the South. Although Democrats won in a landslide nationally, Goldwater won a ring of states in the solid south, including South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. To the moderate Republicans, Barry Goldwater represented the right-wing fringe of the Republican Party, but to Southern Democrats, he represented their values; he came out strong against communism and for fiscal conservatism, even suggesting that Social Security should be made voluntary (Judis and Teixeira, 2002). Goldwater’s message may not have resonated with Northeastern Republicans, but Southern Democrats decidedly split their tickets.
Johnson’s pursuit of a war against the North Vietnamese to some extent overshadowed his domestic agenda. Under Johnson, Congress fought aggressively to end poverty and enforce civil rights. In the 88th Congress, these two areas were particularly contentious for conservative factions of the Democratic caucus. Four pieces of legislation were especially significant: the Civil Rights Act, the Food Stamp Act, the Equal Opportunity Act and the Equal Pay Act. Where each passed with Northern support, the Southern Democrats protested.
Congress’ anti-poverty agenda under Johnson was met with less resistance than plans to reintegrate the public schools in the South, or to enforce voting rights. In the 88th Congress, the House passed the Equal Opportunity Act (EOA) in 1964, creating an Office of Equal Opportunity to administer programs to the poor that promote health, education and welfare. Among Democrats, EOA passed 204-40, but all 40 “nay” votes from Democrats arose from the Southern faction. The Food Stamp Act of 1964, creating a supplemental food program for the impoverished likewise passed the House with 216 Democrats supporting the measure, and 26 Democrats opposed; Southern Democrats accounted for 24 of the 26. Mayhew (1966) argues that the proportion of Blacks in Southern Congressional districts can more accurately describe differences between Northerners and Southerners. Mayhew found that districts with higher proportions of Blacks tended to have more fiscally conservative Congressmen, though he notes that the trend varies by state (Mayhew, 1966). Across Johnson’s agenda, it seemed, Southerners disagreed with Northern Democratic leadership about the precise role of the federal government.
Of course, the most salient issue for Southern Democratic leadership was civil rights measures. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the House with 152 Democratic “ayes” and 91 “nays”, but Southerners accounted for 87 nays. Only 8 Southern Democrats voted for the bill. In the 89th Congress (1965-67), the Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed with 221 Democratic “ayes” and 67 “nays”, and all 67 dissenters were Southern Democrats. Finally, in the 90th Congress (1967-69), the Civil Rights Act of 1969 passed 150-88 among Democrats, with 70 Southern dissenters. Civil rights legislation tended to aggravate the racial divide, and in 1968, Southern Democrats found themselves without a formal standard bearer.
The inadequacy of both parties (most visibly the Democratic Party) to address Southern dissatisfaction with civil rights measures allowed Alabama Governor George Wallace to launch an independent bid for the presidency. Similar to Dixicrat Strom Thurmond (1948) and Republican Barry Goldwater (1962) before him, Wallace won the states in the Deep South. Wallace’s attempt to deprive the Democrats of enough Southern electoral votes to play kingmaker in the House of Representatives failed. He won several states in the Deep South, but failed to build upon the Goldwater coalition. An alternative view involving the combined Wallace and Nixon vote suggests that the states might have voted for Nixon in 1968 if Wallace did not run. Judis and Teixeira (2002) found that former Wallace supporters simply switched party allegiance and voted for Nixon in 1972. Nixon and Wallace received 71% of Florida’s vote in 1968, while Nixon received 72% in 1972; Mississippi supported Nixon and Wallace with 78% in 1968, and Nixon with 78% in 1972; South Carolina supported Nixon and Wallace with 70% support in 1968, and 71% for Nixon in 1972 (Judis and Texieira, 2002). Black (2004) notes that starting in 1968, scores of White Southern males started rejecting the Democratic Party label, and identifying as independent or even as Republican (Black, 2004). The plan to capture white Southern males was the core of Nixon’s “Southern strategy.” The movement of Southerners away from the Democratic Party however, involved more than just the segregation issue alone. Neither Republicans nor their party leader Nixon endorsed Jim Crowe. Instead, Nixon would capitalize on themes of ‘law and order’ and ‘states rights’ to woo Southern whites, illuminating the dysfunction within the Democratic Party and breaking down the one-party politics of the old South.
In the first instance, Nixon’s ‘law and order’ appeal filled a void amidst the social disorder. The 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago provided little solace for those seeking refuge under the Democratic banner: the floor fight inside the convention, and the protests and riots outside made the Democrats looked unorganized and chaotic. Broad trends also illuminated the social chaos of the late 1960’s: protest to the Vietnam War erupted on college campuses across the nation; a string of U.S. Supreme Court cases guaranteeing rights to the accused made it seem as though government was sympathetic to criminals; new factions of Black militants, sexual revolutionaries, and feminists demanded new or expanded rights; the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy (Judis and Teixeira, 2002).
Nixon was also able to seize upon the Democrats’ lack of party unity. “Feeling thermometer” ratings using a 7-point scale to measure attitudes of survey respondents in the late 1960’s revealed a trend away from the party’s ideological unity. Mayer (1996) found that the standard deviation indices increased among Democratic respondents across the party’s constituency groups, indicating that there was significant disagreement within party on crucial issues (Mayer, 1996). As the Democrats struggled to build party cohesiveness, Nixon to seized on the social and political chaos to promote law and order as a campaign theme (Flamm, 2005).

Republican themes of law and order restoration also had another effect specific to the Southern Democratic caucus: the continued erosion of one-party politics in the South. In his book describing Southern life, Cash (1941) described the Democratic Party as a singular institution that was engrained in Southern culture and inherited Southern values. Cash’s description of Southern politics in the 1940’s provides a unique comparison to the movement within the Democratic Party starting in the late 1960’s worth quoting at length:
The world knows the story of the Democratic Party in the South; how, once violence had opened the way to political action, this party became the institutionalized incarnation of the will to White Supremacy. How, indeed, it ceased to be a party in the South, and became a party of the South, a kind of confraternity having in its keeping the whole corpus of Southern loyalties, and so irresistibly commanding the allegiance of faithful whites that to doubt it, to question it in any detail, was ipso facto to stand branded as a renegade to race, to county, to God, and to Southern Womanhood (Cash, 1941).
V. O. Key (1955) asserted that the party was once the only vehicle for Southern policy-makers to pursue political careers (Key, 1955). In essence, the South was a one-party state with its own factions and political divides within the Democratic construct but outside a specific ideological framework. The Democratic Party of the South was an amalgam of ideas, interests, and power dynamics, all intimately concerned with racial issues but divided on the role of government and over economic issues in general. Discussing the changes in the economy since FDR’s programs, Key wrote that: “Democratic solidarity could probably not survive another New Deal.” Black (2004) further explains Key’s prediction in retrospect, contending that the Great Society initiatives were devastating for the national Democratic Party because they added racial liberalism to economic liberalism (Black, 2004).
Political observers might think that the reverberations from Nixon’s Southern strategy and the breakdown of one-party politics in the South would have immediate implications for the Congress. According to this hypothesis, new legions of independent or Republican Congressional members should have accompanied the Goldwater, Wallace and Nixon presidential victories across the South. In reality, the Republican invasion of the South through the Southern strategy was gradual. In the intervening period between 1960 and 1980, Republicans only acquired 23 new Congressional members from the South. Mayhew (1966) offers a couple explanations to justify this phenomenon. Examining roll call votes on economic issues, Mayhew found that Southern Democrats were very welded to the interests of their constituencies. Southern Democrats held a varied propensity to vote for pro-labor bills, and for many Democrats, the only time the party position had merit was on the vote for final passage. Although Figure 2.1 demonstrated that the median party loyalty score was particularly high, Mayhew offers a frequency distribution as it relates to economic bills specifically and shows that most Southern Congressmen (among Democrats elected to at least five postwar Congresses) was skewed to the right, illustrating lower loyalty scores for most Southern Congressmen. More significantly, Mayhew also found differences between votes in general election years and midterms. Comparing the 1960 vote for Kennedy and the mean party loyalty scores, Mayhew found: “[an impressive tendency] for conservative constituencies to sustain conservative Democrats in Congress, but to bolt the party in presidential elections” (Mayhew, 1966).

Mayhew identified a trend in 1966 that remained true through the next two decades: although Republicans gradually captured more House seats as a result of their Southern strategy, otherwise conservative Southern constituencies sustained their Democratic Congressman for generations. Explains the University of Delaware’s Dr. James R. Soles, “people vote out of habit.” Indeed, the habit of voting Democratic maintained the Democratic dominance of the South through the 1960’s and 1970’s, even as one-party politics was on decline. Key (1955) said of the break down of one-party politics: “When law school seniors who contemplate the possibility of soon running for the legislature begin to give deliberation to their choice of party affiliation, then a competitive party politics will have arrived in the South” (Key, 1955).
The late 1970’s marked a period where sociopolitical resistance to Northern Democratic policies started to create a conflict outside the South as well. The focus started to shift, from Southern Democrats providing the most resistance to New Deal-era policies, to a new tide of suburban voters who would later be termed ‘Reagan Democrats.’ In 1976, President Jimmy Carter’s pollster Patrick Caddell predicted the emergence of a younger, white-collar, college-educated, middle-income suburban class. In a memo to President Carter advising on political strategy, Caddell wrote: “We must devise a context that is neither traditionally liberal, nor traditionally conservative, one that cuts across traditional ideology.” The baby-boom electorate was suburban, young and professional; it would call itself socially liberal and economically conservative; it would reject McGovern big government, New Left policies, and embrace the politics of the center (Judis and Teixiera, 2002). The emergence of the suburban, white professional would shift resistance in the caucus from exclusively rural Southern constituencies, to new suburban areas.
The greatest impetus for a Democratic Congress and a Democratic president to embrace fiscally conscious polices and cut social spending arose from the economic forces of the late 1970’s. Similar to FDR in 1932, Carter would depart from his party’s traditional position in the face of economic catastrophe. At the start of the 95th Congress, the nation faced rapid stagflation where increases in unemployment accompanied inflation. Gas prices more than doubled, mortgage rates soared above 20%, and inflation surged above 14% by the summer of 1979. The Congress faced the repercussions of price-controls on foreign oil imports, and a resultant energy crisis. Under Carter, Congress would approve measures deregulating transportation industries, remove Nixon-placed price controls on foreign oil imports, cut the capital gains tax on the wealthy, and increase the tax on Social Security. A regressive tax on the middle class was also approved, and Carter controversially used the “anti-union” Taft-Hartley Act to resolve a coal miners’ strike (Selfa, 2008). The measures enacted under Carter were not the result of an ideological shift toward the center, but a necessary shift to improve the economy at a time when Carter’s approval ratings sank below 25% (lower than Nixon during the height of the Watergate scandal). In a letter to Congressional Democrats, Carter wrote: “"New realities must temper our nation's commitment to the poor" (Bosch, 2002).
The left wing of the Democratic Party was furious. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) railed against the Carter Administration cuts while African American Congressional leaders described the Administration’s actions as “immoral, unjust and inequitable” (Bosch, 2002). Carter’s relationship with Congress was also hampered by his desire to see earmarks reduced in the budget. Nevertheless, Congressional leaders acquiesced to, if not supported, many of the president’s initiatives out of economic necessity. Congress approved a Social Security measure that increased withholding from 2% to 6.5% to sustain the programs fiscal solvency through 2030 (Frum, 2000). In 1978, it passed a Revenue Act lowering capital gains tax and corporate taxes. Commenting on the work of the 95th Congress, the AFL-CIO wrote: “[Congress] left behind not a monument to forward-looking legislation, but a tombstone” (Selfa, 2008).
It might be argued that the House showed a commitment to labor through the passage of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1977 (otherwise known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act). The act set specific goals for employment in the U.S., and asserted more broadly that every American has a right to employment. The Humphrey-Hawkins Act reflected Congressional priorities to encourage private development in target areas over public sector jobs. The legislation enumerated four specific goals: expansion of conventional private jobs through improved use of general economic and structural policies; expansion of private jobs to priority areas (education, state and local government, healthcare, etc.); public employment as a last resort; and, public service jobs as a last resort (Congressional Research Service, 1977). The Act passed with 42 Democratic dissenters, the plurality of whom were from Southern constituencies.
Achieving the reluctant support of many Northern Democrats, Carter worked to pass emergency energy and budget measures that attempted to restart private enterprise. At the start of his presidency, Carter’s ambitious agenda included welfare and tax reform, government reorganization, a comprehensive national energy policy and a balanced budget, but he would have to work with House Speaker Tip O’Neill to whittle down priorities (Bosch, 2002). Describing the relationship between the fiscally-minded Democratic President with the Congress, biographer John Farrell said: “Across the table is Tip O'Neill, the quintessential New Deal Democrat -- unrepentant, un-reconstructed, and determined to follow the Roosevelt philosophy of tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect [….] and basically standing for much of what Jimmy Carter had come to Washington to change."
In a sense, the relationship between O’Neill and Carter was emblematic of the divergence of political thought within the party during this period. Between 1960 and 1980, the political identity of the party shifted from a New Deal coalition to a new progressive union of McGovern and Kennedy New Left Democrats who fought to maintain the party’s commitment to civil rights and anti-poverty programs. At the same time, an alternative tradition withstood the trials of the Vietnam Era in the form of Southern Democrats loyal to the party, and the emergent baby boomers of the suburbs. With Carter’s abysmal performance in the 1980 election, Republican President Ronald Reagan would build a new majority that demanded government non-intervention, and for eight years during his presidency, found a strain of disaffected Democrats who were willing to give him the Congressional approval he needed
Boll Weevils and Reagan Democrats, 1980-1992
The period of 1980 to 1992 represented an era where conservative Democrats found and established an identity. Nearly 50 years after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the first New Deal program, President-elect Ronald Reagan was poised to dismantle a federal budget deemed ‘out of control.’ The philosophy of ‘tax and spend’, argued Reagan, increased the size of government and interfered with the inherent economic liberties of man. By 1980, the communist threat was deeply engrained in a generation of American families. Reagan fundamentally believed that government was not the solution to domestic problems, and argued that tax relief, deficit reduction and privatization would reign in the size and scope of government. Domestically, President Reagan divested in federal programs, proposed hiring freezes on federal employment, reengineered the tax system, and devolved federal powers. Internationally, he buttressed the Defense Department’s budget to unprecedented levels to combat the Soviet threat. President Reagan presided over realignment in American political philosophy where his domestic and foreign policy introduced a new politics reverberant in the 21st Century: neo-conservatism.
Conservative Democrats in the Congress were not neo-conservative ideologically, but for many, the election of President Ronald Reagan signaled a shift in both the political and philosophical environment of the U.S. House of Representatives. Politically, Reagan entered the 97th Congress with a perceived mandate: he won in all but 7 statewide contests, beating an incumbent president by 9 percentage points in the popular vote margin. He put together a strong coalition of moderate and conservative Americans from across the economic spectrum, winning majorities among working class, Christian, and White voters. Reagan performed well in Southern and rural regions as well, carrying suburban and rural voters by wide margins and narrowing Carter’s lead in urban areas (Brandt 2009). Democrats lost 33 seats in 1980, but still retained control of the House of Representatives. Split ticket voting among constituents paved a new political environment for many of the Democratic Party’s conservative Congressional members, leading to the organization of pro-Reagan Democrats.
Shortly after the 1980 election, Representative Charles W. Stenholm (D-TX) organized the Conservative Democratic Forum (CDF) to empower Reagan Democrats in the Congress to stand against the liberal Democratic leadership of Tip O’Neill. In a letter to Jack Hightower (D-TX), Stenholm explained the goal of the CDF using an analogy to the Boll Weevil Monument in Enterprise, Alabama. Stenholm believed that similar to the boll weevil, which wreaked havoc on cotton crops and forced farmers to diversify, the CDF would damage the Democratic Party, but force it to diversify and inspire others to work for change (Brandt 2009). The CDF, explained Stenholm, would become an independent force in Congress that would primarily focus on budget issues and avoid contentious debates regarding social policy.
The CDF was to become a forum for conservative Democrats in Congress to express ideas along a set of ideologically similar perspectives. In an informational packet delivered at the start of the 98th Congress, the CDF explained: “People should be free to live their lives without undue/unneeded involvement from the federal government. State and local governments respond better to people’s individual needs … A conservative Democrat rejects the notion of blindly following the party line and instead tries to represent his or her constituents within the party.” In differentiation with themselves and the Republican Party, Stenholm explained, conservative Democrats “prefer fiscal responsibility over tax cuts [where] Republicans have never seen a tax cut they don’t like” (Brandt, 2009). Fiscal responsibility, government efficiency, and devolution of power to state and local governments became a platform for CDF members to communicate division within their party to their constituents. The formation of an organization furthermore provided bargaining power against the Democratic leadership on matters of fiscal policy. It also provided the new Reagan Administration with a fertile cohort of Democrats to persuade in the Congress. The CDF played a crucial role in advancing the cause of conservative Democrats in two particular areas: through the voting patters as a cohort on the House floor, and through the placement and formation of policy within committee.

The 1982 budget debate is one example that illuminates the power of the CDF as a cohort on the House floor. On April 9, 1981, the Democratic-controlled Budget Committee of the House of Representatives approved the 1982 budget, calling for less spending in defense and more spending in social programs. The Democratic plan contrasted greatly with the Republican proposal to spend more on defense and reduce the federal deficit by spending less on social programs. CDF member Phil Gramm (D-TX) quickly endorsed the Republican proposal, prompting the Reagan Administration to title their 1982 proposal: “The Bipartisan Coalition for Fiscal Responsibility.” Support for the Republican bill increased within the Democratic caucus, and despite the pleas of Speaker O’Neill, the Gramm-Latta substitute for 1982 budget was approved over the Democratic proposal. The substitute passed 253-176, with 38 out of 47 CDF members voting with the Republicans. Following a number of amendments through reconciliation with the Senate version, the CDF helped the Reagan Administration introduce cuts to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamp, and student loan programs claiming that these federal programs had grown too rapidly and amounted to excessive federal entitlement spending. The reconciliation measure passed 217-211, with 27 CDF members voting for passage. To hold moderate Republicans, the Reagan Administration conceded some increases in federal spending, including Medicaid and energy assistance to the impoverished. Nevertheless, the final 1982-budget measure called for a savings of $36.7 billion in FY 1982 federal outlays. CDF members allowed Reagan to describe the budget as a ‘bipartisan success.’
In 1981, the Reagan Administration passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), enacting steep federal income tax cuts for wealthy Americans by reducing the highest income-earning bracket’s burden by 23% and lowering the lowest bracket by 3%. ERTA similarly passed the House with significant CDF support, with 31 CDF members voting in favor, and 16 opposed.
The 1982 budget fight and the 1981 ERTA were examples of negotiation and compromise with conservative Democrats. In the former budget proposal, the administration agreed to hold back on cutting specific entitlement programs to maintain moderate Republicans and win several conservative Democrats. With respect to the later tax bill, the Reagan administration settled for a piece of legislation that was narrower in scope and included less sweeping federal income tax cuts. In both instances compromise retained Reagan’s relationship with his own party and appealed to the conservative faction of the Democratic Party. In a sense, Reagan’s domestic agenda was philosophically and politically favorable among conservative Democrats.
The CDF’s success on the floor was accompanied by lobbying efforts aimed at placing members in strategic committees. A CDF vote study, released December 1, 1982, found that conservative members were ideologically underrepresented in the Budget, Rules and Ways and Means committees. Using an aggregate of seven interest group scores for each of the committee members, where percentage points increase with conservatism, the CDF found that the mean Budget, Rules and Ways and Means member score was smaller (or more liberal) than other Congressional committees. The CDF analysis grouped individual Congressmen by score range according to a 5-tier scale (“conservative, moderate conservative, moderate, moderate liberal and liberal”) and found that as a caucus, Democrats are comprised of members in each of the five categories. Under the CDF methodology, there were no liberal or moderate liberal Congressional Republicans. This broader point underscores the reality that the Democratic caucus was ideologically diverse and thus, more prone to dissent along factional lines (Brandt, 2009). A more strategically relevant point for Democrats at the time involved the leadership’s attempt at keeping conservative members out of key committees (Aistrup, 1996).
Despite their pleas for more visibility, the Democratic leadership deprived CDF members of key committee assignments. Several prominent members, including Andy Ireland, Phil Gramm and later, current U.S. Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), abandoned the Democratic Party for the GOP. Some CDF members threatened to challenge O’Neill for the speakership. After the 1984 presidential election, Speaker O’Neill announced the formation of a new strategy that addressed the disaffected conservatives: “The truth of the matter is that for many years we paid no attention to one group in the Caucus, the conservatives. We felt that there was no need for them; there were always 25 or 35 Republicans who would vote along with us” (Brandt, 2009). O’Neill provided Marvin Leath (D-TX) and Dan Daniel (D-VA) with positions on the Budget Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, respectively.
Accommodation became increasingly unnecessary. Through the late 1980’s, the Boll Weevil Movement and conservative Democrats encountered less resistance in the Democratic caucus. Scholars offer a few explanations for this phenomenon. Aistrup (1996) observes that starting in 1983, there was a “permanent and leftward” shift among Southern Democrats. Examining the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores for the cohorts of Democrats entering the Congresses between 1977 and 1987, Aistrup found that mean ADA score increased 15-20 points from the mid-to-late 1970’s. The ADA scores and regression tests of Reagan’s victory percentage in Southern Democratic districts demonstrate increasing moderation among Southern Democrats. First, Aistrup notes that biracial supporting coalitions were formed in the “peripheral South” (defined as having a Black population of less than 15% of the district). In these peripheral districts, Whites worked with Blacks to elect agreeable candidates, in part because the threat of a successful Black candidate at the state or local level was nominal given the low percentage of Blacks in the district. Aistrup also discusses the role of “White reactionaries”, where districts with fewer Blacks tended to have less conservative Whites. A second argument involves replacement. Older conservative cohorts, Aistrup finds, left the party, and contributed to a rise in mean ADA scores. Combining research from Abromowitz (1990), Aistrup found that Southern Republicans tended to be more homogenous in their ideological orientation, while voters may not have initially noticed the gradual leftward movement of Southern Democrats.
Brandt (1996) offers a few more arguments concerning the leftward movement of Southern Democrats in the 1980’s. First, in many primary campaigns, as more moderates voted with Reagan, liberals became the main primary constituency. Second, with the introduction of two-party politics in the South, the acceptability of voting Republican gradually gained greater social acceptability. Finally, younger Southern Democrats were ideologically similar to the national Democratic platform than both their older contemporaries and previous cohorts of young Democrats. The cumulative effect of all these factors led to increased competition in a once one-party state. In 1984, the defeat of Boll Weevil Jack Hightower (D-TX) by a conservative Republican reflected the increasing partisanship and the coming era of Republican dominance of the South (Brandt 1996).
Change was slow to impact the South, but many of the converts within primary constituencies were not loyalist Democrats. Prysby (1992) found that between 1980 and 1983, 20.1% of Republican activists were converted Democrats, which grew slightly between 1984 and 1991 when that proportion increased to 21.8%. The vast majority of those who switched party affiliations described themselves as “very conservative” or “conservative” (36.7% and 44.8%, respectively) (Prysby 1992). Aistrup (1992) underscores Prysby’s findings, concluding: “Democratic converts to the GOP [were] considerably more conservative than loyalist Democrats.”
Ronald Reagan’s popularity complemented changes in supporting coalitions. In 1984, Reagan was reelected with 58.8% of the popular vote and 525 electoral votes. Reagan carried every state except Minnesota and the District of Columbia, and won among working-class whites and Southern Democrats, who frequently attributed the economic recovery with the Reagan presidency. Despite Republican success at the presidential level, the House Democratic caucus picked up more seats in the late 1980’s than lost: as Table 1 shows, between the 99th and 101st Congress (1985-91) Democrats gained only 8 seats. It wouldn’t be until 1994 that the Republicans would carry a majority of Southern districts, and that a new coalition of fiscally conservative Congressmen would be founded.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Role of Factionalism
The Role of Constituency
Modern conceptions of the Congressman offer two conflicting, if not dichotomous, lenses of constituency accountability. Where some have argued that the Congressman must consider the position of district constituency on most votes, others rely on the representative to exercise his or her best judgment in making voting decisions (Fenno 1978). In the former delegate model of constituency accountability, it has been argued that Congressmen must be completely responsive to the interests of the people they represent. The delegate model entrusts representatives with the responsibility to vote according to prevailing constituency attitudes alone. The later trustee model conceives of the Congressman as an individual actor who makes voting decisions without reference to constituency position. Those who want representatives to act as trustees recognize the complicated (often nuanced) nature of public policy and argue that representatives are elected to exercise judgment on behalf of the public interest.
Attempts to delineate the responsibilities of the representative into two opposing models provide a theoretical framework for understanding the complex relationship between the Congressman and his or her constituency. Representatives perceive themselves as both delegates and trustees of constituent concerns (Fenno, 1978). On highly salient issues where the public is intimately concerned with policy outcomes, Congressmen generally adhere to constituency attitudes. On less salient minor votes where little or no public opinion is expressed, Congressmen can exercise a wide degree of autonomy in making voting decisions (Kingdon, 1974). The degree to which an individual Congressmen adheres to constituency opinion when there is a conflict with his or her personal ideology or policy preference requires an assessment of the political environment that allows representatives to cast votes in opposition to the prevailing view of their constituency (Fenno, 1978; Kingdon 1973). Mayhew (1974) argued that although many Congressmen are assured reelection victory, tremendous variability from year-to-year inspires uncertainty. For many representatives, the fear of the unknown primary or general election challenger or amorphous special interest mobilizing against them inspires caution in roll call voting. Given that Congressmen are primarily motivated by reelection prospects, they must individually weigh the degree to which the issues, events or circumstances change from year to year (Mayhew, 1974). The focus here is on the degree to which Congressmen in “marginal” districts assess the uncertainty of their political environment and vote with party and against the majority view of their district constituency.
The condition that binds Blue Dogs to become delegates of their constituencies has been termed the “marginality hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis, members of Congress elected from marginal districts display more moderation in their voting behavior than Congressmen from “safe” districts (Fiorina, 1974; Sullivan and Uslaner, 1978). Starting in the early 1970’s, scholars observed two phenomena. First, incumbents were winning with greater electoral margins (Erikson, 1972; Ansolabehere, Brady, & Fiorina, 1992). Second, the proportion of Congressmen elected marginally—usually with less than 50% support—was declining (Mayhew, 1974). The study of marginal voting behavior demonstrated that roll call votes were indeed related to election percentages (Erikson, 1971; Mayhew, 1974). Over the next 35 years of discursive research, scholars have both rejected and reaffirmed the validity of the marginality hypothesis (Griffin, 2006). For the purpose of this research, the marginality hypothesis is assumed to be true. Despite the lack of consensus in the political science literature, objective and empirical measures of voting behavior indicate that Congressmen pay at least some attention to their reelection margins in assessing how to vote (Fenno, 1978).
The marginality hypothesis assumes that Congressmen act as individual rational actors. Derived from economic theory, the application of the rational actor to Congressional voting behavior was established by Anthony Downs’ “An Economic Theory of Democracy” in 1957. In Downs’ analysis, constituents determine which party is most likely to deliver tangible benefits by weighing one party against the other in a primarily retrospective manner. Within this framework, parties are cohesive “teams” that are entirely selfish and aim to maximize their collective power (Downs, 1957; Mayhew 1974). Downs however, did not address intraparty opposition. In Downs’ universe, Congressmen make ‘rational’ decisions to maximize the party’s electoral benefits, but it left unanswered the question of intraparty dissenters.
In 1974, David Mayhew proposed that Congressmen are preeminently motivated by the reelection incentive. “Safe” Congressmen are not defined by well-cushioned electoral victory margins, but by uninterrupted electoral success. Within the Congress, it was not the party that guided Congressmen’s voting decisions, but the individual Congressman. Representatives engage in a process of advertising, credit claiming and position taking to brand, articulate and express individual values. Advertising emphasizes themes, including independence, sincerity, and responsiveness among others. Claiming credit for legislation brands the Congressman with an identity. Finally, Congressmen take positions to further distinguish themselves on various issues. Each strategy aims to define and individualize the representative to achieve reelection success (Mayhew, 1974).
Individual reelection is the ultimate goal, but sometimes Congressmen are confronted with voting choices where personal ideology or policy preference conflict with constituency attitudes. In his quantitative content analysis of Congressional interviews, John Kingdon (1973) found that more than any other variable, constituency attitudes are most highly correlated with Congressional vote outcomes. In instances where Congressmen are confronted with divergent policy choices, they may vote against the perceived interests of constituency if they redefine or reframe the issue to their benefit. The decision to vote with or against the perceived constituency position involves weighing both the intensity of feeling within the district and the general salience of the issue. Congressmen do not feel that one particular vote will cost them reelection, but they do believe that the cumulative effect of a “string of votes” could have electoral consequences (Kingdon, 1973). Given the uncertainty surrounding future elections, Congressmen adopt strategies to distinguish themselves as individuals (Mayhew) and present themselves to their constituency (Fenno & Kingdon).
In instances where a Congressman’s policy preference diverges from constituency, the representative has to determine exactly ‘who’ is paying attention to the vote. Representatives must determine which votes will be controversial among his or her supporting coalition. Kingdon identifies this process as a “problemistic search.” (Kingdon, 1973). The calculus of Congressional decision-making is complex, but in its most basic form identifies the votes and group impacted by the votes that may harm the Congressman in the next election. Formerly active supporters of an incumbent’s coalition may not turn out or withhold campaign funds if they are unenthused with a Congressman’s voting record. If a group of individuals or a particular organization is particularly antagonized, they may electioneer against the incumbent (Kingdon, 1973; Fenno, 1978). Congressmen are thus not only motivated to win reelection, but also to hold their coalition of supporters together. Thus, Congressmen are constantly checking their “field of forces” to weigh the intensity of conflicting interests against one another (Kingdon, 1973).
Although Congressmen are always cognizant of the uncertainty overshadowing the next election, they are also aware of the possibility to improve or expand their supporting coalition’s margins. A weak opponent can buttress victory margins, just as a strong opponent can drain an incumbent of their marginal supporters (Fenno, 1978). Literature chronicling Congressional interactions both in Washington and at home reveals that in general, representatives are aware of the coalitions that support their reelection efforts. The implication of course is that awareness affects legislative outcomes (Kingdon, 1973).
Variability from election to election nevertheless forces Congressmen to adopt strategies that mitigate the repercussions of controversial votes. Fenno’s thesis that Congressmen adopt a “home style” to present themselves and explain their voting behavior is one such mitigation strategy (Fenno, 1978). Yet another is to recruit candidates who will not be enticed into divergent policy predicaments in the first place. The most obvious is to avoid conflict all together by casting a vote with the perceived constituency position (Kingdon, 1973). Where none of these resolutions are possible, Congressmen must justify the legislation on substantive policy grounds to segmented audiences of supporters and non-supporters alike (Fenno, 1973).
The predicament of the Congressman who votes against his or her constituency’s interest is not completely bleak. First, Kingdon enumerates many institutional and tactical strategies that help Congressmen reframe or refocus the issue to their advantage. The vast majority of legislation passed by the House of Representatives must first be reviewed, amended and passed by the Senate. Congressmen can note that the process of legislating is long, and emphasize their agreement with only certain provisions of bills. Sometimes Congressmen can describe their advocacy for amendments to legislation, or plead the parliamentary situation that forces them to vote for or against the overall substance of bills. Where parliamentary pleas fail, Congressmen avoid commitment until last minute and then cite respected authorities or other constituents (Kingdon, 1973).
Most roll call votes will not be controversial. Congressmen frequently vote to name a federal post office, honor a national pastime or recognize an individual for a significant accomplishment. The nuances of policy and procedure further dilute the public’s interest. In a body of 435 elected representatives, keeping track of introduced amendments and procedural floor motions require salaried staffs to monitor floor action. Congressmen are aware that most votes will not draw the ire of their constituency, and vote knowing that only a few informed constituents are watching in real time.
Nevertheless, Congressmen are also aware of their political environment. Potential opponents can run ads ‘educating’ the public about a Congressmen’s Washington voting behaviors in the next election, special interests can feed an opponent’s primary or general election coffers, and elites can defect from a Congressman’s reelection constituency. To combat these realities, representatives engage in direct communication with constituents to preempt challenges. Education initiatives can include utilizing Congressional franking privileges, speaking at public events within the district, and appearing on television or radio programs (Kingdon, 1973; Fenno, 1978). The advent of the Internet and direct e-mail communication allows Congressmen to instantly inform supporting coalitions of their voting rationale.
The cumulative effects of these education efforts ensure that Congressmen are recognized as individuals within the House of Representatives. Mayhew describes the situation of individualizing within district as a “zero-sum conflict” among members. Congressmen advertise, claim credit and take positions to distinguish themselves from the collective whole (Mayhew, 1974). Richard Fenno’s qualitative case study analysis describing the interactions of 18 members within district illustrates how easy it is for representatives to run against the House of Representatives as an institution. Distinguishing themselves as individuals and claiming that the House as a whole is inefficient delivers immediate benefits without electoral consequence (Fenno, 1978).
Although studies into the extent of the marginality hypothesis have produced variable outcomes, a few truths about constituency are prominent in the literature. First, all Congressmen feel uncertainty about future electoral outcomes and are motivated by their quest for reelection (Mayhew, 1974). Second, concern for constituency informs Congressmen from “safe” districts and “competitive” districts alike (Kingdon, 1973). Finally, the strategies Congressmen employ to explain policy positions that diverge from constituency both individualize the Congressmen and refocus the issue (Mayhew, 1974; Kingdon, 1973). These strategies help define the Congressmen in a unique presentation of self that the Congressman adopts as his “home style” outside Washington (Fenno, 1978). The story of Congressional interaction with constituencies can thus be read as a balancing act between the delegate and trustee models of representation. Congressmen vote according to their policy preferences but check their “field of forces” for opposition.
CHAPTER 3: DATA ANALYSIS
**Purpose is to draw differences between the coalitions and demonstrate marginality, answering the first research question.
Methodology
Demographic, electoral and voting records data was collected for each of the 254 Congressional Democrats serving in the 111th U.S. Congress (January 3, 2009 to January 11, 2011.) Information was gathered from a variety of government and non-government data-reporting sources including the 2000 U.S. Census, Congressional Quarterly, and Project Vote Smart. The sources for each individual variable are listed below. The aggregate data was analyzed for descriptive statistics, correlations and significance across two or more variables. Results fall within a 95% confidence interval according to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences: Predictive Analytics SoftWare.
The data analysis methodology was implemented to determine the demographic, regional and electoral characteristics that define and describe the members of the Blue Dog coalition and the districts they represent. Results were compared with the Progressive Caucus, New Democrats’ caucus, and the Democratic Congress as a whole to derive conclusions relating to the Blue Dog membership. Roll call votes in the House of Representatives were reported by secondary source, data-reporting firms (Congressional Quarterly, GovTrack.us and OpenCongress.org.) Significant votes among members in the 111th Congress were recorded, as well as Congressional Quarterly’s reporting of 14 select votes in the 110th Congress.
Overall, the data analysis methodology can reveal the policy implications for the Democratic caucus on roll call votes across coalition, the agenda-setting phenomena of Congressional Blue Dogs, roll call vote similarities that indicate cue-shopping, and the district-demographic and political correlates among Blue Dog members and with the Democratic caucus as a whole. Data analysis methodology is limited in its receptiveness to informal relationships among members that can influence Congressional voting decisions. This methodology is also immeasurably limited by informal influences of the party leadership and personal ideology. Nevertheless, general trends can be read from the data that can indicate and describe voting patterns among members.
Criteria for Evaluating Roll Call Votes
Roll call votes were selected based upon an evaluation of two criteria: (i) issue salience or, (ii) budget measures. Highly salient votes are those where the media, interest groups and the public at large have varied interests in Congressional voting outcomes. Examples of salient legislation include the Democrats’ healthcare legislation, climate change proposal, and the economic stimulus package. Salient votes were selected because constituent pressures to vote with the interests of the Congressional district would be most burdensome to the Congressmen. Budget measures test the proclivity of Blue Dog Democrats to vote against the Congressional Democratic leadership when the constituency is not watching voting behaviors. Budget proposals include the less salient votes on the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), the recovery supplemental and an omnibus appropriations bill, among others.
The purpose of these two measures was to derive conclusions about issue salience and coalition-level ideology. Extraneous interests that affect legislative outcomes limit this approach to roll call voting analysis. Nevertheless, criteria that establish boundaries for analysis help limit the wide scope of roll call votes that Congressmen consider. To date (August 7, 2010), the 111th Congress has called 1,505 votes. This analysis measures 16 votes in both the 1st and 2nd sessions according to a subjective evaluation of salience and relevance to the Blue Dog coalition’s ideological reliance on budget measures. Finally, several salient issues were selected from Congressional Quarterly’s evaluation of key votes in the 110th Congress to provide longitudinal analysis. Data reported here records only the votes of Congressmen serving in the 110th Congress.
Results
In 2006, the Democratic Party captured the U.S. House of Representatives and expanded the Democratic majority from 203 to 235 by the end of the 110th U.S. Congress. In 2008, the Democratic Congress expanded its majority to 255 in a presidential election year and anti-incumbency realignment. The Democratic Party particularly succeeded in winning ‘marginal’ Congressional districts in rural Southern and Western constituencies. Many voters in these districts split their tickets and voted to elect a Republican president and sent a Democrat to Congress. Table 2 illustrates coalition growth by year. Growth in membership within the Democratic Congress coincided with growth in the Congressional coalitions. Relevant here is the growth of the Blue Dog districts from 36 to 54 between 2004 and 2008. Although the increase seems minimal, many of the districts Democrats acquired in this period share unique political, geographic, and demographic characteristics that could explain interest group scores and roll call voting behavior. Inevitably, the growth of the Blue Dogs in marginal districts tests the marginality hypothesis and illustrates the necessity for content analysis of Congressman-constituency voting rationale.
Political Circumstances & Contexts
Victory margins at the presidential and Congressional level help describe district political culture and competitiveness. In 2004, former President George W. Bush (R) won Blue Dog districts with 54.4%, while Senator John Kerry (D-MA) lost with 44.8%. Blue Dog districts again exhibited a higher level of split ticket voting in 2008 when Senator John McCain (R-AZ) won with an average of 49.9% to then-Senator Barack Obama’s (D-IL) 48.5%. By comparison, the Congressional districts of Progressive Caucus members supported the Democratic presidential candidates in 2004 and 2008 with 68.5% and 73.4%, respectively. Democratic presidential candidates also carried New Democrat districts with an average of 52.5% and 57.5%, respectively. The trend of increasing competitiveness according to the ideological orientation of Congressional districts reaffirms the hypothesis that members generally reflect the values of constituents.
The second metric of individual Congressional victory margins does not provide a similarly clear delineation of ideological orientation and coalition membership. In general, Blue Dog and New Democratic incumbents were reelected according to similar victory margins in 2008. Both Blue Dogs and New Democrats won with 63.3% average support. The level of support is of course variable across a number of sociopolitical contexts and electoral circumstances. In contrast, Progressive members were elected with 77.4% support. This finding indicates Progressive members are safer in their reelection quest than their Blue Dog colleagues. Although the deviation is a little higher for Progressives compared with Blue Dogs, in general Blue Dogs, New Democrats and Progressives all hail from districts that send them to Congress with at least 63% support. The finding is consistent with the literature’s evaluation of incumbency advantage.

A final index of district political competitiveness is a combination of Congressional and presidential victory margins. Political analyst Charlie Cook created the index to compare district party preferences with national trends. According to the Cook Parisian Voting Index (PVI), districts with higher “D or R +” demarcations indicate higher party preferences among district constituents. Representatives who hail from districts where the opposite party holds an advantage are theoretically more susceptible to electoral challenges. The average PVI for Blue Dogs was R + 3.7, while Progressives were much more safe with an average PVI of D + 20.5. New Democrats’ districts averaged D + 3.9.
Geographic & Demographic Statistics
Geographic and demographic comparisons measure the homogeneity and heterogeneity of districts according to region, urbanity, income, education, workforce occupation and race. Blue Dog members represent disproportionately Southern and Western constituencies, while New Democrats and Progressive Caucus members represent generally Northeastern and Western constituencies. Table 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of members as a percent of coalition. A further breakdown by urbanity also demonstrates contrasts. Blue Dogs tend to represent rural areas, while New Democrats represent suburban and urban constituencies and Progressive Caucus members represent urban environments.
Rural Blue Dog districts earn a median annual income of $38,274 compared with Progressive members ($41,189) and New Democrats ($46,226). The standard deviation of mean district income of Blue Dogs is less than the deviations for Progressive and New Democrats, indicating that Blue Dog districts tend to be slightly more cohesive and homogenous than other coalition member’s districts (Blue Dog σ = $7,115; New Democrats σ = $11,250; Progressive Caucus σ = $10,780).
Mean college education levels followed in a similar pattern to median income, but the spread only falls within 5% of each coalition. Although income is correlated with education at .712, the three Congressional coalitions exhibited less variability in their mean college education levels than may have been anticipated. 20.2% of Blue Dog districts acquired at least a bachelor’s degree compared with 24.2% of Progressive Caucus members’ districts and 25.2% of New Democrats’ districts. Another indicator of district socioeconomic status, the percent of district workers employed through white-collar versus blue-collar professions, also does not exhibit tremendous variability. On average, 55.7% of Blue Dog districts are employed in a white-collar job, compared to 60.9% of Progressive Caucus members’ districts and 59.6% of New Democrats’ districts. Blue Dog districts have higher levels of workers employed in blue-collar professions compared with other coalitions: Blue Dogs (29.1%), Progressives (22.5%) and New Democrats (23.8%).
Finally, district racial demographics indicate that Blue Dog districts are more homogenous with higher proportions of Whites compared with racially heterogeneous Progressive districts. The average Blue Dog district is 73.9% White, 10.0% Black, 10.7% Hispanic and 2.2% Asian. Progressive districts, as a result of urbanity, are more racially diverse with constituencies averaging 49.8% White, 23.3% Black, 17.7% Hispanic and 5.9% Asian makeup. New Democrats’ districts fell in the middle of the racial diversity index, averaging constituencies that are 68.6% White, 12.1% Black, 12.7% Hispanic and 3.9% Asian.

Figure 1 shows the mean with the standard deviations by Congressional coalition. Given that Blue Dogs represent more rural constituencies, the mean is both higher among Whites, lower among other races and accordingly, the deviations are lower in all but the Hispanic category. Two phenomena can be inferred from the data. First, as the Democratic majority expanded in 2006 and 2008, Democrats won more seats in the West and thus, the coalition gained more members that represented Hispanic constituencies. As a result, the standard deviation reflects both the highly homogenous constituencies of the predominately rural South, and more heterogeneous Hispanic communities of the West. Second, overall Progressives maintain the largest deviations because they represent urban constituencies that are varied in racial demography.
Member’s Roll Call Vote Analysis
Blue Dog Coalition members tended to diverge from the Democratic majority on both social and economic pieces of legislation. Although the coalition itself does not articulate social values within its coalition platform, it clear that a cohort of representatives are opposed to certain measures of the Democratic majority. It is speculated, and could later be confirmed through content analysis, that the reason for opposition on certain social matters is because of the issue salience within constituency.
In the 110th Congress, House Amendment 368 would have deleted language within a piece of legislation that provided for international women’s reproductive facilities (abortion clinics) (Table 3.2). Of the Democrats who opposed the measure, 9 were Southern and 11 were Midwestern. In the 111th U.S. Congress, 15 out of 52 Blue Dogs opposed H.R. 1913, the Local Law Enforcement & Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which allocated funding to local law enforcement agencies to combat hate crimes based on sexual orientation (Table 3.20). Content analysis will be required among the dissenting Democrats to determine whether Congressmen explained their opposition along budget lines or through moral disapproval. On a preliminary review of the cross tabulation of Democrats opposing the hate crimes bill, 12 of the 16 dissenters were Southern. The final social issue that derived tremendous divergence with the Democratic majority was with respect to gun ownership (Table 3.19). In a Senate version of a consumer credit protection bill, Senator Tom Colburn (R-OK) introduced an amendment to protect gun owners’ rights to own and operate a firearm in national parks. 47 out of 53 Blue Dogs voted for the measure while the Progressive Caucus stood opposed.
Several budgetary pieces of legislation were selected because of the Blue Dog’s interest in scaling back federal programs to achieve deficit neutrality. In the 110th, 10 out of 48 Blue Dogs voted against Department of State appropriations and 12 out of 45 voted against the auto bailout (Table 3.4). In the 111th Congress, where the Progressive Caucus stood unanimously in support of H.R. 1: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 9 out of 53 Blue Dogs voted in opposition to ARRA (Table 3.14). An additional 17 out of 53 opposed a supplemental appropriations act to the ARRA shortly thereafter, and 16 out of 53 opposed an omnibus appropriations act (Table 3.16). Minor budgetary measures appear to draw the opposition of a select Southern Blue Dog constituency.
Blue Dogs also opposed the majority on highly salient fiscal matters. For the purpose of this analysis, three areas are specifically examined: cap and trade, healthcare and Wall Street reform. In June 2009, the House narrowly passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy & Security Act. The bill would establish a cap and trade market for polluters to buy and sell carbon emissions. Supporters argued that the bill would reduce carbon emissions and incentivize the industry into alternative energy research. Opponents asserted that the legislation would hurt business and deepen unemployment. The “cap and trade” bill earned both tremendous support and opposition from several actors within and outside the Congress. Environmentalists and clean energy advocates amassed in support of the bill, while industry, business and labor opposed. Ultimately, the House passed the bill 218-212, with 8 Republicans voting in the affirmative. 66% of the dissenting Democrats (28 out of 42) were Blue Dogs, 20 of whom were from the South. Without some Republican support, Blue Dog opposition would have killed the cap-and-trade measure on the House floor (Table 3.21).
The most salient issue of the 111th Congress was arguably the debate over the future of American healthcare. On two separate proposals, Democrats moved for comprehensive healthcare reform before narrowly passing a final Senate version. The Democrats’ initial healthcare bill calling for a robust public option passed in November 2009, but failed to secure the support it needed in the Senate. The Affordable Healthcare for America Act passed with 24 out of 53 Blue Dogs opposing the measure. Blue Dogs represented 66% of the dissenting Democrats (36 Democrats opposed the bill in total.) Geographically, 22 of opposing Democrats represented Southern constituencies (Table 3.23).
Once it became clear that the public option would not pass the Senate, the Democratic leadership scrambled to garner popular support among Blue Dogs and progressives for a less encompassing Senate-modified version. Blue Dogs reaffirmed their concern for the fiscal responsibility and deficit neutrality while progressives argued that a bill without a public option would not cover enough Americans. In March of 2010, the House narrowly passed the Senate version, 219-212. The final healthcare vote did not carry one Republican supporter. 32 Democrats voted against the majority. 24 of the 32 Democrats were Blue Dogs, and 21 represented Southern constituencies (Table 3.27). A less-salient but highly publicized vote of the 111th Congress involved Wall Street reform (Table 3.24). 13 out of 52 Blue Dogs voted against the measure, representing 25 of the Democratic dissenters. Consistent with geographic trends, 13 opposing Congressmen represented Southern districts.
The Blue Dog Coalition has been the most consistently opposed bloc of representatives against the interests of the Democratic majority. In 2008, Blue Dogs voted with the Democratic majority on 91.0% of roll call votes, compared with the New Democrats (94.7%) and the Progressive Caucus (97.0%). The year before, Blue Dogs voted with the Republican majority on 21.7% of roll call votes, compared with the New Democrats (18.2%) and the Progressive Caucus (21.7%). Despite their affirmation of deficit neutral budget priorities, the coalition did succeed in passing pay-as-you-go measures in July of 2009. 53 members of the Blue Dog Coalition supported the measure while 10 Progressive Caucus members opposed. Although specific opposition to the majority is difficult to assign to one particular bloc, it is clear that the Southern delegation of Blue Dog members opposes the majority most frequently (Table 3.22).

Interest group scores evaluate individual Congressmen as rational actors. Collectively, they are measures of individual policy positions. This section evaluates four areas of interest group policy focuses: social issues, economic issues, environmental issues and on overall ideological orientation. The scores are aggregated across the three coalitions and compared against one another. Blue Dog coalition members consistently scored lower than their Democratic colleagues in every interest area except the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (economic) and American Conservative Union (ideological). The Progressive Caucus earns its highest marks with the AFL-CIO, the Human Rights Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and Americans for Democratic Action. New Democrats fall in the center with neither the low indices of Blue Dog Congressmen nor high indices of Progressive Caucus members.
Blue Dogs consistently scored lower with interest groups evaluating social issues (Planned Parenthood and the Human Rights Campaign). Blue Dogs earned a 55.5% score from HRC, compared with New Democrats (80.3%) and Progressive Caucus members (95.8%). Planned Parenthood gave Blue Dogs an average score of 59.4%, compared with similarly higher ratings for New Democrats (91.3%) and Progressive Caucus members (99%). Specific votes appear highly correlated with interest group scores. Members’ votes against the contraception amendment in the 110th Congress for instance, are inversely rated with the Planned Parenthood score by -.847. In contrast, members’ votes for the hate crimes bill is only correlated with the Human Rights Campaign score by .276. The hate crimes bill and Human Rights Campaign score might be less significantly correlated because of the nuances of public policy. Where the contraception amendment was a black and white indicator of support or opposition to international family planning agencies, members could oppose the hate crimes bill on budgetary grounds.
Economic policy positions were measured using the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO’s evaluation of individual Congressmen. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce scored Blue Dogs higher than any other Congressional caucus of the Democratic Party with 64.4%. New Democrats were scored with the second highest index at 62%, while the Progressive Caucus earned 53.5%. In contrast, the AFL-CIO scored the Blue Dog coalition lowest amongst the three coalitions with 82.7% favorability, and gave New Democrats a 90.4% evaluation and Progressives a 96.7%. These scores indicate that Blue Dogs as a coalition are more likely to weigh labor and business interests in making voting decisions. Votes on spending bills are generally inversely related the U.S. Chamber of Commerce score, however not by significant margins. The AFL-CIO score also did not appear to evaluate one specific vote in the 110th Congress.
The only interest group that scored environmental issues in this sample was the League of Conservation Voters. Blue Dogs earned lower scores than their Democratic colleagues with an average score of 80.2%, compared with New Democrats (92.4%) and Progressive Caucus members (96.4%). The LCV vote was available for all members serving in the 1st Session of the 111th Congress. Members’ vote for the cap and trade bill was positively related to the LCV score by .627.
Two ideological interest groups were selected to evaluate coalition voting behavior. Americans for Democratic Action, an interest group inspired by the George McGovern wing of the Democratic Party, scored Blue Dogs the lowest with 80.4%, compared to New Democrats (87.7%) and Progressive Caucus members (95.2%). The American Conservative Union by contrast evaluated Blue Dogs the highest among three coalitions with 27.8% favorability, compared with New Democrats (13.2%) and Progressive Caucus members (3.8%).
The seven interest groups help delineate the policy dispositions of individual members. On social issues, Blue Dogs are reliably conservative compared with New Democrats and Progressive Caucus members. Although the coalition itself does not espouse conservative values as part of its platform, depressed ratings from the Human Rights Campaign and Planned Parenthood could indicate that Blue Dog members hold more conservative views on social issues. Correspondingly, on economic and budgetary matters—where the coalition platform calls for fiscally responsible strategies aimed at reducing the deficit—Blue Dogs earn higher evaluations with the business community, and depressed scores from labor.
Limitations & Further Explanations
Variable Confounds
Interest Group Scores. Interest group scores are based on algorithms produced by an evaluation of a representative’s voting record. More weight may be placed on specific votes or factors over others. Organizations may or may not enumerate these factors in their methodology. These specific organizations were chosen based on fulfillment of at least two of three criterion: (i) citation by Congressional Quarterly, (ii) prominence as an advocacy organization and/or (iii) recent and updated scores. Only a few organizations had updated scores as of the 1st Session of the 111th Congress. As a result, many freshmen members and members elected in 2009 and 2010 were excluded. Two ideological organizations were also chosen. Americans for Democratic Action and the American Conservative Union were selected based on Congressional Quarterly’s reliance on them as a refutable source of advocacy on behalf of liberal or conservative ideology, respectively. The ADA and ACU scores represent a broad evaluation on economic, social and international issues.
Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI). The CPVI is supposed to measure ideological orientation of a House member’s Congressional district; however I believe the algorithm that derives the rating ignores several outside variables. The CPVI may not be sensitive to split-ticket voting, where an electorate of a Congressional district may be more accustomed to voting for a Democrat in Congressional elections and a Republican in presidential elections. A similar confound relates to the unmeasured influence of incumbency, where members of Congress may represent a ‘more conservative’ constituency, but are nevertheless reelected because of the popularity that results from their tenure in Congress. Finally, other influences create significant situational variability when comparing House races to the national politics. It is important to emphasize that politics at the local level is relative in comparison to politics at the national level. Constituencies may ignore national factors and focus on more salient local factors in determining how to vote in a Congressional election. As a result of these confounds, CPVI is only used as a descriptor to further delineate between Blue Dog districts, and other Democratic constituencies.
Excluded for Incomplete Voting Records
Democratic members who excluded from the dataset as a result of a special election included John Garamendi (CA-10), who replaced Ellen Tauscher on Nov. 5, 2009, Judy Chu (CA-32) who replaced Hilda Solis on July 16, 2009, Mike Quigley (IL-5) who replaced Rahm Emanuel on April 21, 2009, Scott Murphy (NY-20) who replaced Kirsten Gillibrand on April 29, 2009, and Bill Owens (NY-23) who replaced John McHugh on November 6, 2009. Two members elected in 2010 were also excluded. These include Ted Deutch (FL-19) who replaced Robert Wexler and Mark Critz (PA-12) who replaced John Murtha on May 20, 2010. Parker Griffith (AL-5), formerly a Congressional Blue Dog Democrat, was excluded from the dataset after he switched parties in Congress on December 22, 2009.
Discussion
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CHAPTER 4: CONTENT ANALYSIS
In the previous section, I explored the marginality phenomena in the 111th U.S. Congress. Blue Dog Democrats represent districts of distinctly unique electoral circumstances when compared with the districts of Progressives and New Democrats. I also showed how Blue Dog districts are
250 press releases representing 2 votes among 125 Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives were analyzed for content according to a detailed rubric. Press releases were read for statements that fulfilled specified criteria. Each of the evaluated areas follows from the academic literature’s delineation of how Congressmen explain votes to constituents. Press release responses were entered into an online survey and catalogued in an online database. Substantive, open-ended responses were also compiled in a number of areas. After completing the evaluation process for each of the two votes, the aggregate press release statements were compiled into a document that separated Blue Dog responses from Progressive responses for comparison.
Blue Dogs were compared with Progressives specifically for three reasons. First, unlike the New Democratic coalition, there is no overlap in membership. The New Democrats members hail from both conservative and progressive orientations and are thus ideologically heterogeneous as a caucus. Second, Blue Dogs and Progressives offer the greatest contrast from one another
Analyzed Legislation
The two votes that were analyzed included two highly salient measures passed in both sessions of the 111th Congress. The first vote, H.R. 2454: The American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009 passed the U.S. House of Representatives on June 26, 2009. Also known as the “cap and trade bill” or the “Waxman-Markey bill”, the final floor vote passed narrowly, 219-212 with 8 Republicans supporting the measure, and 44 Democrats in opposition. Among the Democratic coalitions analyzed here, all 71 Progressive Caucus members supported it, in contrast with 25 Blue Dogs who voted for and 28 Blue Dogs who voted against the bill. The second analyzed vote was the motion to concur in Senate amendments and pass H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. H.R. 3590 was also known as the “healthcare bill” and was more broadly referred to as “health insurance reform.” It passed the House on March 21, 2010 by a narrow vote of 219-212. No Republicans supported the bill on final passage, and 24 Blue Dogs opposed the measure. Every member of the Progressive Caucus supported the bill on final passage.

Salient Votes
Highly salient votes, as opposed to symbolic or minor votes, were chosen for three reasons, the first of which explains the nature of issue salience: constituents are most likely to pay attention and participate in the politics when an issue or upcoming vote dominates the news cycle and/or presents obvious implications for a person’s daily life. Constituents saw immediate and lasting effects behind both the cap and trade and health care reform legislation, and as a result, participated in the political process by writing their Congressperson, calling their office, or participating in rallies. The increase in participation among constituents and constituent groups forces Congressmen to more thoroughly evaluate the political context and consequences of voting behavior.
Second, a vote’s high issue salience increases the likelihood and necessity of a Congressman to explain his or her voting behavior. This is accomplished through a number of methods: Congressmen can claim credit for successful amendments or bills and advertise themselves according to a certain legislative philosophy; they could defer to the wisdom provided by a local, state or national organization, other constituents, fellow Congressmen or another committee or subcommittee; or they could adopt a home-style that contextualizes explaining behavior to the district. The tendency to exercise one of many different strategies reflects a personal stylistic preference. The question of whether or not differences persist in explaining phenomena differ across coalition answers a fundamental research question in this thesis.
Finally, and most specifically, highly salient votes increase the likelihood that a Congressperson will issue a press release in the first place. These votes were selected because of the need to obtain a representative sample from each of the two coalitions. Although some Congressmen did not issue press releases, a sufficient amount of them did to discuss legislative explaining behavior in detail. Minor and symbolic votes, concerning the naming of a federal post office or celebrating a national pastime for instance, are less likely to attract the ire of a constituency or constituent group, and reduce the likelihood of a Congressperson saying anything about the subject.
Limitations
This content analysis methodology suffers two particular limitations. First, although the sample size is particularly high, only two votes were analyzed. Given the time and resources available, it would take significantly more time to read every press release for each coalition analyzed within the scope of this thesis for the 111th Congress. To describe more broad narratives, this methodology could also be implemented to discuss New Democratic explaining phenomena or even the behaviors of Congressional Republican coalitions.
The second limitation concerns the sample field. In order to maintain consistency across both coalitions, only press releases were analyzed for both Blue Dogs and Progressive Caucus members. However, it should be noted that Congressmen explain their votes to constituents through other mechanisms aside from the press release alone. Newspaper articles, newsmagazine periodicals, radio and television interview transcripts, issue statements or position papers on a Congressperson’s website were excluded because of the variability in format that each presents. In tailoring a message, the format a Congressperson chooses to communicate his or her rationale is reflective of their distinct homestyle. It is thus possible that in a large rural district, a Congressperson will give an interview to a local paper that relays their message to a plurality of district residents instead of issuing a press release. Similarly, a Congressperson might not choose to issue any statement, consistent with their homestyle, relying instead on personal interaction and group presentations when they go home to describe their vote. For the purpose of mitigating the consequences of including every possible format, the press release was chosen because it represents the most common form of communication to district constituents.
Definitions
Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) or “Progressive Caucus.” The CPC was founded in 1991 and consists of 83 affiliated members of the 111th U.S. Congress. According to the Progressive Caucus’ website, the coalition is rooted in four key principles: (i) economic justice and security; (ii) protecting and preserving civil rights and civil liberties; (iii) promoting global peace and security; and, (iv) environmental protection and energy independence. The Progressive Caucus is the most liberal wing of the Democratic Party. CPC members fight for universal healthcare, investment in public education, collective bargaining for labor unions and for federal minimum wage increases according to the federal poverty line. Socially, the CPC platform states that the coalition works to protect privacy interests. On foreign policy, the CPC advocates for an expedient end to the Iraq War, international cooperation, nuclear proliferation, and investment in international public health and nutrition programs. Finally, the CPC considers global climate change a serious threat that endangers global sustainability. The coalition advocates for regulation and energy diversity, among other measures to divest in foreign oil and invest in alternative energy solutions.
New Democrats Coalition (NDC) or “New Democrats”. The NDC was founded in 1997 and consists of 68 members in the 111th U.S. Congress. The New Democrats’ website identifies their critical issues as: (i) economic growth, (ii) national security, (iii) personal responsibility, and (iv) technological development. NDC members tend to be more neoliberal in policy orientation and many of its members affiliate with the “centrist” or “moderate” wing of the Democratic Party. Hailing from the third way politics of the 1990’s under President William Jefferson Clinton, the NDC affirms “fiscal responsibility”, free trade and pro-growth economic policies. The New Democrats also promote strong and robust military. To accomplish these goals, the NDC is divided into five separate task forces on energy, financial services, health care, innovation and competitiveness, and trade.
Blue Dog Democrats (BDC) or “Blue Dogs.” The Blue Dog coalition was founded in 1994 and consists of 54 members in the 111th U.S. Congress. According to an abridged content analysis of press releases on the Blue Dog Democrats’ Coalition website, its members assert and introduce statutory PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) measures, balanced budget proposals, deficit reduction strategies, and “fiscal responsibility.” Blue Dog Democrats are considered to be the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party.



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